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Abstract: Here we argue that the notion of falsifiability, a key concept in defining 
a valid scientific theory, can be quantified using Bayesian Model Selection, 
which is a standard tool in modern statistics. This relates falsifiability to the 
quantitative version of the Occam’s razor, and allows transforming some long-
running arguments about validity of certain scientific theories from philosophical 
discussions to mathematical calculations. 
 
Reinvigorated by Steinhardt’s criticism of unfalsifiability of multiverse inflationary cosmology,1 
which was flexible enough to explain both negative and positive results of the BICEP2 
experiment,2 the past year has resulted in a renewed interest in the old debate: What defines the 
scientific method?3 What makes a good physical theory? While the underlying inflationary theory 
is mathematically sophisticated and modern, the debate itself has been surprisingly qualitative3, 
similar to what it could have been long ago, when Popper brought falsifiability in the spotlight.4 
Such data-less and often extremistically binary arguments (e.g., should falsifiability be “retired” 
altogether?5) seem out of place in data-driven, real-valued scientific word. 
 
In fact, we already have a mathematical framework to do much better! It is based on statistical 
principles that have long been a part of science. In particular, falsifiability is not an independent 
concept: its graded, real-valued generalization emerges automatically from the empirical nature of 
science, similarly to how the Occam's razor transformed itself from a qualitative philosophical 
principle into a statistical result.6,7 
 
This is easy to see in the language of Bayesian statistics. Suppose we want to decide which of two 
theories, T1 and T2, explains the world better. Our a priori knowledge of this is summarized in 
Bayesian priors, P1,2. After experimental data x are collected, the ratio of posterior probabilities of 
the theories is given by the Bayes theorem, !(!!|𝒙)!(!!|𝒙) = !(𝒙|!!)!!!(𝒙|!!)!!, where 𝑃(𝒙|𝑇!,!) are the likelihood 
terms, that is, the probabilities to get the observed data within the theory. The likelihood increases 
when the theory “fits” the data. However, because probabilities must be normalized, the 
likelihood decreases as the inverse of the total number of all typical data sets that could have been 
generated within the theory. This tradeoff between the quality of fit and the statistical complexity 
is known as Bayesian model selection, and it is used routinely in modern statistics. It provides an 
automatic Occam razor against statistically complex theories, which depends only weakly on 
specifics of the priors. 
 
At an extreme, any data set is equally compatible with an unfalsifiable theory, and hence can 
come from it with the same probability. Thus the likelihood is equal to the inverse of the total 
possible number of experimentally distinct data sets. In contrast, a falsifiable theory would be 
incompatible with some data, and hence would have a higher probability of generating the other 	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data. The difference between the theories would grow with the number of conducted experiments. 
Thus within Bayesian model selection, any falsifiable theory that fits data well would win 
eventually, unless the unfalsifiable theory had astronomically higher a priori odds. For example, 
evolution cannot generate “fossil rabbits in the Precambrian” (J.B.S. Haldane).  This leads to an 
immediate empirical, quantitative choice of evolutionary theory over creationism as the best 
explanation of the fossil record, without the need to reject creationism a priori as unscientific. 
 
In other words, there is no need to require falsifiability of physical theories: it follows directly 
from statistical principles, on which empirical science is built. Its statistical version is more 
nuanced, as has been recognized by philosophers.7 The practical applications are hard, requiring 
computing probabilities of arbitrary experimental outcomes (in fact, it was an error in such a 
computation that started the current controversy). In addition, there is an uncomfortable 
possibility that statistics can reject a true theory, which just happens to be unfalisfiable. And yet, 
crucially, statistical model selection is quantitative and evidence-driven, potentially moving the 
inflationary multiverse debate and similar discussions from the realm of philosophy to that of 
empirical, physical science.  Indeed, while inflation predicts many different worlds, it is 
incompatible with some worlds – the theory is not completely unfalsifiable!  One can hope to end 
the long-running arguments about its scientific merits by calculating the relevant likelihood 
terms. 
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